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Abstract
Everyone holds personal information about others. Each person’s privacy thus critically depends on the interplay of multiple
actors. In an age of technology integration, this interdependence of data protection is becoming a major threat to privacy. Yet
current regulation focuses on the sharing of information between two parties rather than multiactor situations. This study
highlights how current policy inadequacies, illustrated by the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, can be
overcome by means of a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Specifically, the authors introduce a new phenomenological
framework to explain interdependent infringements. This framework builds on parallels between property and privacy and
suggests that interdependent peer protection necessitates three hierarchical steps, “the 3Rs”: realize, recognize, and respect. In
response to observed failures at these steps, the authors identify four classes of intervention that constitute a toolbox addressing
what can be done by marketers, regulators, and privacy organizations. While the first three classes of interventions address issues
arising from the corresponding 3Rs, the authors specifically advocate for a fourth class of interventions that proposes radical
alternatives that shift the responsibilities for privacy protection away from consumers.
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It is a little-discussed yet indisputable fact that privacy is not
just personal, but interdependent. People are socially inter-
twined (Jetten, Haslam, and Alexander 2012) and bond with
each other by sharing information (Petronio 2000). Conse-
quently, everyone holding information about us, be it compa-
nies or other consumers, can compromise our privacy by
passing on personal information that we might not have volun-
teered ourselves. Privacy is, therefore, a multiactor phenom-
enon. As technology advances to facilitate passive information
sharing over an expanding range of devices (Be´langer and
Crossler 2011; Fu et al. 2017; Williams, Nurse, and Creese
2016), consumers who hold and collect information about oth-
ers, such as their family or colleagues, pose an increasing threat
to these others’ privacy. This threat is likely to increase in
scope and complexity worldwide (Walker 2016). It affects
marketers, who often are in charge of data collection, and it
affects policy makers, who have yet to devote their full atten-
tion to the privacy infringements that arise from the use of data
by private individuals. Presently, the issue of interdependent
privacy constitutes a regulatory loophole even for the current
best in class, the European Union General Data Protection
Regulation (EU GDPR).
To illustrate the problem, let us introduce the case of Jane,
which we will refer to throughout. Jane stands for any con-
sumer who wants to download an app requesting access to data
that may concern others. In the case of Jane, she wants to
download a weather app. When she clicks “install,” she not
only gets the app’s promised services, but also says “yes” to
its request to access all her contacts as part of the download.
With this small act, Jane essentially agrees to share the personal
data of people other than herself.
That this can have momentous consequences has become
evident in the case of Cambridge Analytica. The company
received the personal information of more than 71 million
people from only 270,000 consumers who installed its app-
based personality quiz on Facebook (Bowcott and Hern
2018). On average, everyone taking that quiz infringed on the
privacy of 263 others. The increasing integration of technology
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into everyday activities and homes will ensure that problems
like this multiply across the globe. When downloading apps,
people often volunteer access to data that others might rightly
claim, such as contacts, pictures, or conversation logs. When
plugging in “always-on” listening devices, such as Amazon
Echo or smart TVs, people even agree to the passive monitor-
ing of all their social surroundings.
Given these developments, interdependent privacy protec-
tion is a pressing issue. To date, there are only a few scholarly
contributions on the phenomenon (e.g., Biczo´k and Chia 2013;
Litt and Hargittai 2014; Morlok 2016; Pu and Grossklags 2016)
and the scope of potential damages (Harkous and Aberer 2017;
Olteanu et al. 2017). For example, Litt and Hargittai (2014)
show that gender and digital media experience relate to the
online sharing of pictures involving others and that this may
come at a social cost. Similarly, Pu and Grossklags (2016) find
that privacy concerns also affect how users value their friends’
personal information. While addressing several interesting
facets of the phenomenon, these studies hold only partial
insights into why and how interdependent privacy infringe-
ments happen and do not address how these can be reduced
or affected by marketers and regulators.
This article attempts to provide such insights. We draw on
the conceptual similarity with the multiactor phenomenon of
property and engage in a multicase analysis of interdependent
infringements of both privacy and property rights by other
consumers. From this analysis we derive a hierarchical frame-
work, the “3R” framework, that helps explain why consumers
may fail to protect others’ personal data. In addition, we
develop four classes of interventions that can help prevent or
circumvent these failures. These interventions pertain to all
stakeholders, include elements of self-regulation and regula-
tion, and serve as a toolbox for all those interested in, or respon-
sible for, interdependent privacy protection. Figure 1
summarizes the main problem, the framework of empirical
insights, and the resulting interventions.
This article provides the first encompassing analytical,
solution-focused, and policy-related analysis of interdependent
privacy protection across fields. The novel 3R framework
expands prior privacy work by focusing on multiactor, rather
than dyadic, information transfers. It takes a novel approach by
intertwining privacy and property conceptually and thus allows
for fresh insights on both phenomena. Importantly, it also helps
explain why interdependent privacy protection frequently fails
in digital contexts and why current data protection efforts fall
short in preventing interdependent privacy breaches.
We begin by examining the interdependence of privacy
and the failure of current policies to adequately address the
issue. We then identify what can be learned from conceptua-
lizing personal data as property before discussing the methods
used to develop the 3R framework. Next, we provide a
detailed analysis of the four intervention classes that arise
from the framework. To better illustrate the scope of regula-
tory gaps and the policy interventions, we use examples of EU
and U.S. jurisdictions. The article ends with a discussion of
how to draw on the framework’s hierarchical properties to
prioritize available interventions and our conclusion that sus-
tainable interdependent privacy protection necessitates radi-
cal alternatives.
Theoretical Background
Privacy as an Interdependent Phenomenon
The need to belong is a fundamental human need (Baumeister
and Leary 1995). Health and happiness rely on connection to,
and interaction with, others (Jetten, Haslam, and Alexander
2012; Johnson 2003; Lambert et al. 2013). The conduit that
allows for social interaction is communication (i.e., the sharing
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Figure 1. A summary of the problem and solution framework and its conceptual core, the 3R insight framework.
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of information both online and offline; Sinclair and Grieve
2017). Although the information people share with each other
also includes their own personal details, the fact that people
know things about each other gives rise to the notion of privacy
as an interdependent phenomenon (Biczo´k and Chia 2013;
Harkous and Aberer 2017; Pu and Grossklags 2016). The inter-
dependence of privacy means that everyone holding informa-
tion about a person can compromise his or her privacy,
potentially without even noticing (e.g., a slip of the tongue,
posting a picture online, accidentally transferring files contain-
ing intimate information; for multiple examples of interdepen-
dent privacy breaches, see Table 1). This means that there are
potentially many more actors who invade privacy than try to
protect privacy. Once shared, it is easy to lose control over even
the most intimate data (Acquisti, Brandimarte, and Loewen-
stein 2015).
In an analog world, where everybody holds information
about others (Petronio 2000), peer-privacy protection
appears to work according to “implicit norms about what,
why, and to whom information is shared within specific
relationships” (Martin 2016, p. 551). People implicitly
negotiate what information they divulge (Petronio 2015) and
are mostly willing to respect others’ privacy (for insights
along these lines, see Afifi and Caughlin [2006] and Van-
gelisti and Caughlin [1997]). However, with new informa-
tion and communication technologies, these negotiations are
largely absent.
This is particularly problematic because, with new tech-
nologies, the scope for interdependent privacy infringements
is significantly larger. In online settings, where people use
devices to automatically and effortlessly collect and disclose
information digitally (Kamleitner and Mitchell 2018), peer-
privacy protection frequently fails (Litt and Hargittai 2014;
Symeonidis et al. 2016). Although consumers are wary
about others sharing their information online, and may even
suffer from the social costs of having their trust in others
broken (Litt and Hargittai 2014), they nonetheless regularly
click accept to requests for data about others (Morlok 2016;
Pu and Grossklags 2016), effectively infringing others’ pri-
vacy. For example, when people collaborate on folders in
cloud services, such as Google Drive, a collaborator’s beha-
vior contributes significantly to his or her own privacy risks
(Harkous and Aberer 2017) and data volunteered by others
make it difficult for people to keep their location private
(Olteanu et al. 2017, p. 829). To illustrate, when people sign
into a website with their social media account, they are
potentially sharing the data of people in their network. Four
out of five internet users dislike traditional registration
forms, and 73% prefer to log in with their social media
accounts (Bishoff 2016). When an app uses Facebook
authorization, it can ask for up to 40 different permissions,
ranging from access to photos to timeline posts to friends’
lists. As a result, Facebook can track what consumers have
done on over 8.4 million websites with the Facebook like
button (Martineau 2018).
Interdependent Privacy and Current Regulations
The phenomenon of interdependent privacy infringements
arises through the intertwined nature of human beings in soci-
ety. It is, thus, a universal phenomenon that stretches across
legal jurisdictions and becomes more important as humans and
things become more technologically connected, meaning that
more actors could gain and provide access to information at the
tap of a screen.
Despite this, current laws and regulations across various
territories reflect little awareness of the implications of inter-
dependent privacy breaches. The prevalent use case in policy
formulation has tended to simplify informational privacy as a
phenomenon encompassing two actors: the discloser (the con-
sumer or company) and the receiver (the company). This per-
spective appears to inform most privacy regulations (DLA
Piper 2019), including those of the EU and the United States.
Consistent with this perspective, regulators primarily focus on
what organizations, rather than individual consumers like Jane,
do with data. This allows for loopholes when it comes to pri-
vacy infringements as acts of social interdependence.
We illustrate this widespread regulation gap with an analy-
sis of current best-in-class data protection regulation, the EU
GDPR, which became fully enforceable in May 2018. Notably,
the relevance of the GDPR stretches beyond the EU and is, for
example, relevant to U.S. companies that sign up for Privacy
Shield, the U.S. scheme for companies that want to comply
with GDPR. It is applicable to any company worldwide that
holds the data of EU citizens or that processes data of any world
citizen in the EU.
A central Article in the GDPR is Article 6, which spells out
the lawful grounds for processing personal data. Overall, Arti-
cle 6 entails six such lawful grounds. First among them is
paragraph 1a, which specifies consent by the data subject as
a lawful ground. Article 7 further specifies what it means to
obtain informed consent from, and requires notification of, the
original data owner together with easy withdrawal of consent.
This assumes that it is always clear who is the original owner. It
does not acknowledge that humans are socially intertwined and
may have others’ information. For example, some personal
data on Jane’s phone, such as conversations and pictures, may
be claimed by her friends, yet it is Jane, not her friends, who
gives consent for use of the data. Article 7 also overlooks that
personal data of one individual may be held and thus shared by
multiple individuals with organizations. For example, when an
app asks for access to a person’s contacts, the app does not
obtain consent from the original data owner. Neither of these
issues is well-captured by the GDPR or any other regulation
known to us. Indeed, in Article 2, the GDPR specifically
excludes processing of personal data for household or purely
personal purposes. This signals some awareness of the social
necessity of information sharing but simultaneously further
blurs the issue.
The answer to the question of who is responsible for obtain-
ing consent when Jane, as a consumer of a weather app, shares
personal data about others is unclear. Should the onus be on
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Table 1. Illustrative Cases of Interdependent Infringements of Others’ Personal Data Due to Failures to Realize, Recognize, and Respect.
# Failure to Synopsis Context
1 Realize Sharer installs recipient’s always-on device (e.g., Amazon Echo) and does not bother to switch it on and off.
Others come to visit sharer and hold an intimate conversation while the device remains switched on and
listens in.
Digital
2 Realize Sharer is on Facebook and takes part in a quiz programmed by recipient. Without reading, sharer ticks agree
to the terms and conditions that give access to sharer’s profile data. This includes access to her friends’
profiles.
Digital
3 Recognize Sharer proudly posts pictures of “his” child going to the potty for the first time on social media. Digital
4 Recognize Sharer wants a crossword app. When downloading the app, a window pops up. Sharer reads that the app
wants access to all contacts (i.e., personal details of others). Without a second thought, sharer presses
“accept and install.”
Digital
5 Recognize Investigative journalist R tricks politician O’s secretary S to reveal information about politician O by
ostensibly asking S for his own life story.
Analog
6 Respect Sharer hacks other’s Google Drive account and sells pictures of her to the highest bidder R. Digital
7 Respect Sharer knows that a communication app collects others’ data when accessing contacts and call logs but
installs the app like all her friends.
Digital
8 Respect Other breaks up with sharer. Sharer takes revenge and uploads private pictures of other onto website R. Analog
9 Respect Other tells sharer that she has been diagnosed with leukemia. Both likely know that this information is
meant to be for the sharer’s ears only. One day, sharer is drunk and lets slip the news about the diagnosis
to recipient.
Analog
10 Respect Sharer goes shopping and is offered a discount by a shop if he participates in a referral program. Sharer really
wants this discount and provides other’s contacts.
Analog
11 Respect Criminal R asks sharer for other’s personal data at knife point. Sharer provides this information. Analog
12 Recognize Other and sharer prepare a presentation for class. Being in the same program, they have similar-looking USB
flash drives. They save the presentation on other’s stick, which also contains personal pictures and PDFs
of other’s birth certificate. Sharer pockets the stick. When R needs a stick later, sharer quickly volunteers
other’s stick thinking it is his own.
Analog and digital
13 Respect Sharer finds the diary of her roommate O. Sharer sells the diary to researcher (R) who is purchasing diaries
for a research project.
Analog
14 Realize Architect O asks colleague S to comment on her latest design and provides S with access to a folder on a
cloud service. S downloads editing app (R), which requires access to all accounts and files (including on
cloud services).
Digital
15 Realize Sharer opens an email containing spyware programmed by R. This spyware sends all files on sharer’s device
to R. Sharer is a lawyer specializing in patents. Other’s patents are on sharer’s device.
Digital
16 Realize Neighbors sharer and other meet in the supermarket. Sharer is shopping for recipient. Other stands in line
before sharer and accidentally leaves behind a purchased can of tuna. Sharer mindlessly puts other’s tuna
into his bag and brings the entire bag to his recipient.
Analog
17 Recognize Sharer copies a book written by other. As a service to her classmates, she shares the PDF copy with them. Digital
18 Recognize Recipient visits a webpage for free music. She does not recognize that this is an illegal download service and
downloads songs by other artists.
Digital
19 Recognize Other lends a book to sharer. Sharer eventually puts it into a box with random items. When sharer moves
house, he decides to hold a garage sale. Recipient buys the whole box with random items from sharer.
Analog
20 Recognize Sharer, other, and recipient are in a meeting. Sharer asks other for a pen. Next, recipient needs a pen. Sharer
hands recipient other’s pen. Without further thought, recipient pockets the pen when leaving the
meeting.
Analog
21 Respect Bestselling author other has just finished a new book. Sharer learns about this, hacks other’s computer, and
sells the book file to recipient.
Digital
22 Respect Sharer and other jointly write a paper, with sharer taking the lead. Sharer submits the paper to journal
recipient under his own name only.
Digital
23 Respect Sharer and other jointly build a boat. One day, sharer meets recipient, who offers to buy the boat. Sharer
agrees.
Analog
24 Respect S is a burglar. She breaks into the home of other and steals a laptop. She later sells it to recipient on the black
market.
Analog
Notes: Sharers, others, and recipients could be people or organizations.
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Jane to ensure that she only passes on information that she has
permission to give, or should it be the responsibility of the
organizations that receive and request the data to ensure that
they obtain consent from all original data subjects? The com-
mon policy assumption appears to be that if consumers have the
data, then they have the right to share it.
However, this approach is challenged by human rights regu-
lation. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides a right to respect for one’s “private and family life, his
home and his correspondence” (European Court of Human
Rights 2019). Drawing on this right, German courts prosecuted
an individual for sharing others’ data on WhatsApp.1 One could
argue that this ruling offers an alternative regulatory mechanism
for addressing the sharing of others’ data. However, consider
that (1) most consumers use privacy-invasive apps such as
WhatsApp, (2) potentially even more invasive “always-on”
smart technologies are on the rise, and (3) consumers have no
way of finding out which information about them is tracked by
an app or gadget. If consumers are tasked with ensuring consent
for all information they (are made to) share, then every person
would need to prosecute their friends and family.
Thus, even the newest and most comprehensive data protec-
tion policy has its limits when faced with the interplay of the
deeply social and interdependent nature of privacy and new
technological realities that can turn everyday activities into pri-
vacy infringements. Given the opaque data protection policies,
the interdependence of consumers’ privacy not only constitutes a
threat to the individual but also exposes companies and those
drawing on third-party data to the risk of lawsuits (Kamleitner
et al. 2018). This is relevant to marketers, who tend to be
involved in, or even in charge of, customer insights and the
underlying data collection practices. To help determine how to
best allocate responsibilities and enhance interdependent privacy
protection, a better understanding of the underlying phenomenon
and its dynamics is needed. Our starting point for this endeavor
is the conceptual similarity between personal data and property.
Personal Data and Property
Debates on the right to and nature of privacy indicate the exis-
tence of parallels between privacy and property (Cohen 2000;
Laudon 1996; Schoeman 1984; Warren and Brandeis 1890).
On the one hand, personal information, a key element to pri-
vacy, is often treated like property. Like any other good, per-
sonal data is traded in a market that has been valued at over
US$200 billion (Levine 2014). People also feel a sense of
ownership for both property (Etzioni 1991; Pierce, Kostova,
and Dirks 2003) and personal information (Kehr et al. 2015;
Spiekermann and Korunovska 2017). In fact, perceptions of
information ownership are a central premise in the leading
theory on privacy management, communication privacy nan-
agement theory (Petronio 2010; Petronio 2000). On the other
hand, interference with possessions, such as a car or house, may
be viewed as an intrusion of privacy (Benn 1971) because these
possessions count as part of the self and hold information about
us (Belk 2013).
The primary difference between privacy and property lies in
their targets. Privacy has been framed as a right to one’s own
information and personal space, and property as a right to one’s
own possessions. (To bring these differences and similarities to
life, see multiple cases of privacy and property infringement in
Table 1.) The crossover between these rights becomes partic-
ularly pronounced in the case of information goods, such as
software, books, or music (Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Licht-
man 1999; Galbreth, Ghosh, and Shor 2012; Varian 2003).
These goods fall under the remit of property but, mostly
through technology, are as easily shared, transferred, and mul-
tiplied as personal data (Kamleitner and Mitchell 2018). In
addition, as cases 12 and 13 in Table 1 show, personal data is
often stored on tangible possessions. When these possessions
become infringed, this likely entails a simultaneous personal
data infringement.
Personal data and property rights both allow individuals to
exclude others from trespassing onto what is “theirs” (Purtova
2015; Warren and Brandeis 1890). However, as the cases in
Table 1 illustrate, others often have access to what is somebody
else’s. For example, Jane has access to others’ personal data,
which she saves in her contact list. Effectivly protecting per-
sonal data and property from infringement requires cooperation
by those who have access to a person’s goods (Kirk, Peck, and
Swain 2018; Rudmin 1991; Rudmin 2016) or information
(Benn 1971; Petronio 2000; Schwartz 1968). Privacy and prop-
erty rights are interdependent, and their protection requires
multiple actors.
Common social rules reflect and recognize this potential
weak spot. Learning to respect what is others’, including their
secrets (Farrell, DiTunnariello, and Pearson 2014), is an essen-
tial part of humans’ moral development (DeScioli, Rosa, and
Gutchess 2015; Gibbs et al. 2013) and people generally con-
demn the disrespecting of others’ possessions and personal
information as morally wrong. To illustrate, let us revisit Jane
and imagine that a stranger on the street asked her for her
mother’s contact details. Although this does not threaten her
own privacy, Jane might think this an intolerable intrusion into
her mother’s privacy and protect it rather than help infringe it.
In the case of property, respect for others’ property is com-
mon and tends to go unquestioned. This might explain why our
current knowledge on interdependent infringements is scarce,
though urgently needed, as demonstrated in the fictitious case
of Jane and the real-world example of Cambridge Analytica.
Although we have few insights into the dynamics of interde-
pendent personal data infringements such as these, there are
prior insights on related types of infringements. Specifically,
there is research on what makes people engage in property
crime (Andrews and Bonta 2014; Kanazawa and Still 2000;
Tyler 2006) and on the illegal digital sharing of information
goods such as music (Rochelandet and Le Guel 2005; Sinha
and Mandel 2008; Wingrove, Korpas, and Weisz 2011). In a
1 See the full court judgement at http://www.lareda.hessenrecht.hessen.de/
lexsoft/default/hessenrecht_lareda.html#docid:7876045.
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nutshell, insights on these phenomena suggest that people
infringe when they stand to gain from the infringement and
when there is a favorable cost–benefit ratio or, in some cases,
when they want to harm others.
Though informative, these insights do not readily transfer to
interdependent privacy infringements such as the one commit-
ted by Jane when she shared the personal data of her contacts
with the installation of a weather app. Jane is bound to feel
close to at least some of her contacts. It is thus unlikely that she
wants to harm them all. Moreover, her only gain was easy
access to information about the weather, and there are multiple
alternative avenues to gain this information. It is thus unlikely
that Jane infringed on her contacts’ personal data because of the
benefits of infringement. There must be more to interdependent
infringements than current research reveals. Therefore, in the
next section we revisit the basic phenomenon of infringements
due to interdependence (for concrete examples, see Table 1).
The Phenomenon of Infringements Due to
Interdependence
Interdependent infringement means that personal data or prop-
erty is accessed by a party who the owner of that good or
information did not intend to have access. Infringements
become interdependent when this happens through another
party that does have (legitimate) access. This requires at least
three actors. First, it requires one or multiple infringed parties.
In the example of Jane this would be all her contacts. We call
this party the “others.” Second, it requires someone like Jane,
that is, one or multiple people with (legitimate) access to the
others’ data or goods who pass on what is the others’ without
involving them. We call this type of actor the “sharer.” Finally,
it requires one or multiple parties that obtain access to what is
the others’ through the sharer. This would, for example, be the
weather app company that obtains others’ personal data
through Jane and her contact list. We call these actors the
“recipients.” Table 1 illustrates such situations. A situation
qualifies as an infringement when the others have not con-
sented to recipients receiving their goods. Because the good
is transferred through the sharer, the sharer is key to whether
the transfer happens at all, and, if so, whether the others have
the opportunity to consent.
Beyond the described exceptions of self-interest and mal-
icious intent, we know little about why the sharer would enable
an infringement of what is others’. Therefore, it is difficult to
allocate blame or successfully prosecute such cases of interde-
pendent infringements. Similarly, developing strategies to pre-
empt or reduce them is challenging without deeper knowledge.
It is these issues that we consider when next creating a con-
ceptual framework of interdependent protection failures.
Methods
To ensure the required conceptual richness, we examine,
assimilate, and contrast both interdependent privacy and
property infringements. Because cases like Jane’s constitute
the primary regulatory loophole, our focus is on cases in
which the sharer and the other(s) are (multiple) individuals.
Moreover, we particularly focus on the role technology may
play in this, contrasting cases in which the context of infringe-
ment is mediated by digital technologies, such as in the case
of Jane’s weather app, and those that are analog in nature,
such as Jane providing her mother’s data to a stranger on the
street (see Table 1).
Methodological Approach
We conduct an instrumental, multicase study, which allows us
to learn through assimilation and contrast (Stake 2006). To
facilitate insights on whether infringing consumers should be
held responsible, we focus on the phenomenon as experienced
by the person of the sharer (Creswell and Creswell 2017) and
enrich our analyses with aspects of phenomenology (Goulding
2005; Schutz 1967).
Data Collection and Sources
The criterion we used for case inclusion was that cases must
entail an instance of factual infringement. Over the span of a
year, we collected evidence of such instances from a variety of
sources, including stories of infringement from forums on
property and privacy, identified by using simple Google
searches on problems of sharing/infringing/trespassing (for
similar procedures, see Kozinets [2006]); the media; and
numerous formal and informal discussions with experts on
property law and privacy, scholars from a range of disciplines,
students at all levels, audience members of public lectures
given by the authors, family members and friends, and even
strangers who had infringement stories to tell (for a similar
openness to sources see, e.g., Fournier [1998]). Much of this
data collection happened as part of our everyday private and
professional lives and included self-observation data that came
from personal concurrent and retrospective introspection
(Gould 1995; Wallendorf and Brucks 1993; Woodside 2004).
In all instances in which we obtained data through conversa-
tions, we told informants that we are interested in stories or
occurrences in which one person passed on another person’s
property or data.
To allow for the inclusion of examples of different levels of
data richness and maintain our focus on the binding phenom-
enon of infringement, we “formalized” (Herriott and Firestone
[1983], as cited in Stake [2006]) the design of cases and con-
densed each example case into a synopsis. Because our focus
was on the breadth of the phenomenon (for an illustration of
this breadth, see Table 1), we refrained from adding cases that
were very similar in their basic setup.
Analysis Strategy
To analyze and theorize acts of interdependent privacy (and
property) infringement, we focused on the phenomenon of
infringement as experienced by the sharer and adapted the
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seven-step process suggested by Colaizzi (1978). We first read
all the cases we had collected and identified their primary
themes and then engaged in cross-case analysis to extract sig-
nificant components and pivotal occurrences that explain our
phenomenon (Fischer and Otnes 2006). To gain a deeper
understanding of why infringement rather than protection took
place, we reversed the logic and asked what would have been
necessary to protect the good from infringement. Following
Stake’s (2006) approach to multicase studies, we ultimately
posed the question “What helps us understand the phenomen-
ological similarity (i.e., infringement)?” rather than “What
helps us understand each of these cases?”
Next, we searched for deeper meanings and structures
embedded in the extracted elements and repeated this process
to develop common components and sequences. By mining and
reducing the data in a search for patterns and underlying pro-
cesses (Tsoukas 2009), we moved from specific phenomena to
a more abstract theory. Finally, we engaged in several rounds
of rewriting (Morse 1994) to reduce the insights into a concise
structure that explains the behavior.
To allow for easy orientation along the key constructs and
observations, the case base featured in Table 1 is structured
along the domains of personal data (cases 1–11) and other
possessions (cases 14–24) and also features exemplary cases
in which both can be infringed simultaneously (cases 12–13).
In addition, Table 1 indicates whether technology played a role
in an infringement and whether an analog or digital transfer
took place.
The 3R Interdependent Privacy Protection
Framework
We observed acts of infringement ranging from property theft
to an inadvertent slip of the tongue to the passing on of
Facebook friends’ data. Despite this variability, our analyses
suggest that the interdependent protection of what is others’ is
contingent on potential sharers going through three consecutive
and hierarchically dependent steps. We call these the 3Rs of
Realizing (R1), Recognizing (R2), and Respect (R3). Figure 2
illustrates these 3Rs based on the introductory case of Jane.
Note that the multiactor nature of privacy means that there
potentially are many others and many recipients not visually
represented in Figure 2. We discuss the findings against the
backdrop of prior literature on privacy and property and do so
in the order needed for interdependent personal data protec-
tion. We illustrate them with a selection of cases featured in
Table 1, indicate in Table 1 which of the 3Rs may be most
pertinent and provide first ideas about relevant antecedents
and causes of these steps. We mainly use online infringements
of personal data as key cases but use other cases to highlight
specific points.
R1: Realization of Transfer
The first step toward protecting what is others’ is for the sharer
to realize that (s)he is about to transfer the good. If the sharer
fails to realize that (s)he is passing something on to the reci-
pient(s), the sharer necessarily also fails to realize that it is not
his or hers to give. This may appear obvious, but it relies on the
presence of two enabling conditions: salience of the good and
salience of the transaction (see Figure 2). As cases 1, 2, 14, 15,
and 16 illustrate (see Table 1), these conditions are not neces-
sarily met in either privacy or property.
Salience of the transfer. The transfer of tangible goods entails
effort and active involvement by the sharer and can be visually
tracked. In contrast, the transfer of data and intangible goods
requires little physical effort and no easily observable traces are
associated with it. Personal data is hard to trace (Acquisti,
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Figure 2. The 3Rs of interdependent privacy and property protection: The example of an app download.
Notes: Other(s) and sharer(s) could be one or multiple people; recipient(s) could be one or many persons and companies.
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Brandimarte, and Loewenstein 2015), and once their data are
shared, consumers cannot always know what is happening to
them (Almuhimedi et al. 2015). This impedes realization of
transfer. So too does the attention people tend to pay to specific
transfer settings. In digital contexts, consumers have become
used to pressing install without paying attention to notices and
permissions (De Santo and Gaspoz 2015; Jensen, Potts, and
Jensen 2005; see cases 2 and 14). Notably, lack of salience is
characteristic of information but can also happen for goods, such
as in case 16, where the good is hidden among other goods.
Salience of the good. A key difference between property and
personal data is visibility and tangibility, which foster a good’s
salience and help actors realize what happens to it (for some
analyses of the nature of data as a good, see Be´langer and
Crossler [2011], Kamleitner and Mitchell [2018], and Schoe-
man [1984]). This can be observed in case 2, where an app
requests access despite it being not clear to the sharer what the
app actually wants to access. Kamleitner and Mitchell (2018)
describe how the complexity of data makes it hard for people to
truly comprehend data as a good. In turn, this makes it difficult
for people to assign meaning to and evaluate data. Research has
argued that consumer education campaigns aiming to enhance
data and, thus, privacy protection are prone to failure precisely
because data are not perceived as personally relevant and
meaningful (Johnston, Warkentin, and Siponen 2015). In the
domain of property, lack of salience of the good is most likely
to play out digitally with the sharing of intangible (i.e., infor-
mation) goods (e.g., case 14 in Table 1).
Our results and the existing literature align in suggesting
that the context most conducive to failure at R1 is that of
technology-mediated information collection and transfer (for
a deeper analysis of the specifics of digital data transfers, see
Christl and Spiekermann [2016] and Kamleitner and Mitchell
[2018]). Giving permissions to apps and always-on devices
means that people increasingly collect information about others
without realizing either that they have just agreed to a transfer
of data or what good they have shared. Online, both data about
others and information goods may not so much be given as
“leaked” (i.e., given away inadvertently or casually; Morlok
2016; Sarigol, Garcia, and Schweitzer 2014).
R2: Recognition of Others’ Rights
Provided that sharers realize that they have transferred a good,
they next need to recognize others’ rights to this good. Figure 2
illustrates this second stage by veiling the other through a
shaded box. Sharers can only effectively protect others from
infringement if they recognize that their act of sharing concerns
others. People intuitively classify the world along the question
of “Whose is it?” from an early age (Blake and Harris 2011;
Palamar, Le, and Friedman 2012) and are even biologically
hardwired to do so (DeScioli, Rosa, and Gutchess 2015). Com-
prehending what is others facilitates harmonious social inter-
actions and paves the way for shared understandings (Friedman
and Ross 2011; Rudmin 1991). Yet sharers may not always
consider or recognize others’ rights to a good. Ownership attri-
butions can shift in response to, for example, who held it first or
who invested how much (Brown, Pierce, and Crossley 2014;
Friedman 2010; Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, and Hood 2010; Kim
and Kalish 2009; Nancekivell and Friedman 2014; Neary,
Friedman, and Burnstein 2009). Analyzing our cases in this
light reveals not only that R2-Recognition is a necessary sec-
ond condition for peer protection but also that Recognition
depends on similar antecedents as R1-Realization—that is, sal-
ience and understanding. This can manifest in two ways.
Salience of the other. First, people may infringe on others’ rights
because they do not even consider the possibility of others
holding a stake—that is, because the other is not salient. For
example, when downloading an app, a sharer may not even
consider how much right to the information stored on one’s
phone others may hold (e.g., case 4). Apps ask for “the” or
“your” contacts, files, and logs and do not make others salient.
Sharers may fail to consider ownership when an app or service
talks about “the” data (Kamleitner and Mitchell 2018). When
there is no salient connection between the other and the good,
sharers are unable to attribute ownership to the other.
Salience of self-entitlements. Second, there is the potential issue
of self-entitlement blinding people to the possibility of rights
being held by others (such as in case 3). If sharers primarily
perceive a salient connection between themselves and the
good, they may (wrongly) attribute all rights to themselves.
Whether this happens largely depends on the degree of per-
ceived control, knowledge, and investment a sharer has exerted
on a good (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks 2003). For many tangi-
ble goods, only one person can use and control them at a time
(for the effect of perceived control on perceptions of owner-
ship, see, e.g., Peck, Barger, and Webb [2013]). Ownership
attributions for tangible goods are thus relatively clear cut. In
contrast, intangible goods and personal data can be used by
more than one person at a time. In fact, they may be used by
a potentially infinite number of users without the awareness of
the other or the sharer (Kamleitner and Mitchell 2018; Wil-
liams, Nurse, and Creese 2016). Personal information also
tends to be readily at one’s fingertips regardless of whether
others use it. Consequently, the salience of one’s own entitle-
ments to specific information (goods) can quickly unfold, and it
can diminish considerations of others. This is illustrated in case
5, which describes how a person was tricked into revealing
something about another person without even noticing. These
forces can be pronounced when it comes to the digital transfer
of information. People self-collect the information (goods) on
their devices, and because they own these devices, it is easy to
overlook others’ entitlements to this information (good) (see,
e.g., cases 3, 18, and 19 in Table 1).
To conclude, our analyses suggest that failure of recognition
is likely to be a threat to privacy when the other is not partic-
ularly visible in the information shared and when the sharer
feels entitled to the information. These hold for disembodied,
technology-based data transfers, such as in the case of a
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crossword app (case 4), but are rarely the case in analog set-
tings where the other’s identity tends to be a salient part of the
information transfer (e.g., case 9). Although the recognition of
others is more likely in analog settings, others’ claims can and
sometimes are overlooked (for this possibility, see cases 3, 5,
20, and 21 in Table 1).
R3: Respecting Others’ Rights
The final stage needed to prevent interdependent privacy and
property infringements is the respect stage. Although respect
can be defined in many ways (Rogers and Ashforth 2014), we
apply a regulatory lens and refer to it as the fair and lawful
treatment of others (Simon 2007). This means not risking
infringing that which is recognized as belonging to another.
In the respect stage, sharers recognize that others hold justified
rights to the good and now face the decision of whether to
respect others’ rights. This can be done by (1) refraining from
the transfer or (2) obtaining consent from the other. In the case
of personal data, sharers can also resort to (3) modifying or
anonymizing others’ data prior to transfer.
Reigning norms and self-interest. At this step, two generic ante-
cedent forces emerge from our analyses: reigning norms and
self-interest. By and large, people disrespect others’ rights
either because they consider it socially acceptable to do or
because they stand to gain from it. Our analyses suggest that
the respective dominance of these forces varies as a function of
technology integration. In analog settings, deeply ingrained
norms of respect for what is others’ prevail (Goodwin 1991;
Kelvin 1973; Rudmin 1991), and people do not generally give
away possessions or information with which others have
entrusted them (Millar, Turri, and Friedman 2014; Petronio
2015; Schwartz 1968). If they do so, our analysis suggests that
this is because they knowingly put their own interests above
those of others, with the extreme case being criminal intent
(e.g., cases 6 or 22 describing hacking incidents).
In technology-mediated digital settings, both self-interest
and norms appear to be decisive forces for disrespecting what
belongs to others. Consistent with notions such as privacy cal-
culus (e.g., Kehr et al. 2015), which is a much-used paradigm
for personal data sharing, people may sometimes weigh the
benefits to themselves against their own and others’ costs
(e.g., potentially in cases 7 or 10). This is also known
(Henning-Thurau, Henning, and Sattler 2007) and observed
to hold for information goods, such as films, where utility-
driven, economic motives dominate infringment decisions
(Rochelandet and Le Guel 2005).
In addition, people appear to infringe because society
accepts or trivializes disrespect in digital spheres while main-
taining norms of protection and respect in analog settings. An
example of the power of disrespecting norms in the case of
privacy rights is people giving in to peer pressure and know-
ingly installing privacy-invasive apps (e.g., case 7). In digital
settings, sharers may simply think that providing permission
to others’ data is not important because everyone is doing it
(Boyd and Marwick 2011; Raab and Koops 2009). An exam-
ple in the case of property rights is the juxtaposition between
the socially unacceptable action of shoplifting CDs versus the
widely accepted action of illegally downloading music (Free-
stone and Mitchell 2004; Wingrove, Korpas, and Weisz
2011).
To conclude, the forces of self-interest and social norms of
trivialization can induce people to knowingly disrespect oth-
ers’ rights at the R3-Respect stage. In analog settings, such
norms are an inherent part of human socialization, but in
technology-mediated settings, they are less pronounced. We
next use insights on the 3Rs to derive examples of concrete
possibilities for interventions that reduce interdependent pri-
vacy breaches.
Implications of the 3Rs for Personal Data
Protection
The 3R framework gives an alternative perspective on why
current data protection policy and regulation might fail. We
next use this perspective to identify classes of interventions
that aim to prevent failures of the 3Rs. We call these the “4Es,”
and they comprise E1-Ensuring Realization, E2-Encouraging
Recognition, E3-Educating for Respect, and E4-Embracing
radical alternatives (see Figure 1). Table 2 illustrates specific
interventions that fall under these respective classes. Interven-
tion classes E1 through E3 involve interventions that improve
consumers’ ability to take responsibility for others’ data. These
interventions directly relate to our findings and tackle the cor-
responding issues that arise from the respective steps of the 3R
framework. In essence, they incrementally improve interdepen-
dent privacy protection within current dominant practices and
legislations, which tend to allocate responsibility to consumers.
Going beyond E1 through E3, and reflecting new technolo-
gical possibilities, we suggest a fourth class of interventions
(E4) that can advance current practices. These interventions
embrace radical alternatives that shift the onus of privacy pro-
tection away from consumers. They are technology-based (for
prior suggestions of enlisting technology to combat privacy
issues, see Walker [2016]) and help circumvent consumer fail-
ures at the 3Rs and move responsibilities on to intermediaries.
Our suggestions (summarized in Table 2) provide a toolbox of
interventions that can inform all those interested in, or respon-
sible for, reducing interdependent privacy breaches.
All these interventions require different stakeholders to act
(i.e., policy makers and regulators, marketers and industry self-
regulation, and consumer advocacy groups). To illustrate how
and by whom policy interventions could be implemented, we
provide examples from the EU and GDPR. In this regulatory
area, most implications are for the Data Protection Authority
(DPA) in each EU country. In the EU, DPAs handle reports of
data breaches, mediate issues such as data subject access
requests, and work to educate their countries about best prac-
tices in keeping digital data secure (European Commission
2016). In addition, changes in legislation, which may affect the
United States through its Privacy Shield agreement and
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the Federal Trade Commission, need to be addressed through
the European Commission. In other jurisdictions, which tend to
have less data protection (DLA Piper 2019), other authorities
could take responsibility.
Implications for non–policy makers are not restricted to a
judicial territory and include industry-based efforts toward self-
regulation. Relevant codes of practice could be developed by
bodies such as the American Marketing Association, the Digital
Marketing Institute, the Mobile Marketing Association, or the
Software Developers Alliance. In addition, individual businesses
and marketers could draw on the business opportunities offered
by the privacy-friendly innovations we suggest. Finally, indepen-
dent privacy organizations could educate and advocate for self-
protection. We discuss each of the classes of interventions of our
solution framework before offering suggestions on how to prior-
itize them. Table 2 highlights specific interventions and outlines
which stakeholders could best implement them.
E1: Ensuring Realization
Current privacy regulation predominantly follows so-called
“notice and choice” or “awareness” and “control” models
(Milne and Rohm 2000). These are also key planks of the
U.S. Fair Information Practice Principles (Federal Trade Com-
mission 2012) and of the EU GDPR. The main policy tools to
protect privacy in this model are notices and informed consent
(Martin 2015). These are rooted in a dyadic understanding of
privacy between company and consumer and rest on the fun-
damental premise of rational, self-determined consumers who
can obtain and process all the data necessary to enact protection
for themselves. Realization is thus a necessary precondition for
“informed” consent (Martin 2015). As we and others have
shown, this precondition is rarely met, and consumers ignore,
miss, misinterpret, and fail to fully understand what they are
consenting to (Borgesius 2015; Martin 2013; McDonald and
Cranor 2008; Milne and Culnan 2004; Nissenbaum 2011).
We identified a lack of salience of the data and the transfer
decision as primary forces causing such realization failures.
Accordingly, we suggest interventions that enhance salience.
While there are some regulatory efforts in this direction (e.g.,
the GDPR requires data collectors to specify what data are
being collected and how they will be used, under the U.S.
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, consumers can access their
personal data in usable formats), current efforts are bound to
Table 2. Select Interventions per Intervention Class to Improve Interdependent Privacy Protection Across Stakeholders.
# Intervention Primary Stakeholders
Intervention Class
E1 E2 E3 E4
1 Indicate amount (e.g., 1,001 pictures) or monetary value of data being
transferred
Industry 
2 Visualize the process of data transfer before/after obtaining permissions Industry 
3 Change the language from “access to” to “give away” Industry 
4 Indicate the amount of data apps require and rank them on app platforms
accordingly
Industry, privacy organizations 
5 Add/require additional steps of decision control in the transfer process Industry, regulators, DPAs  
6 Provide a preview of actual data (e.g., picture snapshots, contact names) being
given away
Industry  
7 Personalize/identify others’ data (e.g., “all your contacts including the email of
John, the number you call most often”)
Industry, DPA  
8 Add warnings or interdependent privacy requests such as “the data you provide
access to may belong to others. Do you have distribution rights?”
Industry, DPA  
9 Automated permission links sent to others when the system recognizes others DPA   
10 Alert to data tracking (e.g., when inputting a new friend’s data in a phone,
consumers could be asked to confirm that they have consent to share these
data)
Industry, DPA   
11 Publicize lawsuits and harm resulting from interdependent privacy breaches Privacy organizations, DPA   
12 Educate consumers via the power of stories Consumers, DPA   
13 Information campaigns on interdependent privacy DPA, privacy organizations   
14 Draw on the 3R framework for blame allocation DPA, regulators   
15 Design or require products and tools that screen out, blur, or stop sensing when
third parties may be implied
Industry, DPA 
16 Promote or require greater use of personalized privacy assistants Industry, DPA, privacy organizations 
17 Establishment and regulation of personal data managers DPA, regulators 
Notes: E1 ¼ Ensuring Realization; E2 ¼ Encouraging Recognition; E3 ¼ Educating Respect; E4 ¼ Embracing Radical Alternatives Circumventing the 3Rs.
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fall short of ensuring full realization. This is because personal
data descriptions remain rather abstract and are rarely imbued
with the meaning necessary for users to recognize data as a
good (Kamleitner and Mitchell 2018). In addition, consent to
data access and transfer is still given by the simple click of a
button, which is not conducive to full awareness of the actual
transfer and its scope. Other measures to ensure realization are
therefore needed. Importantly, both personal and interdepen-
dent privacy protection depend on realization of a transfer. Any
improvement in interdependent self-protection is bound to also
reduce the problem of self-disclosure.
All of the interventions we suggest to ensure Realization
(interventions 1–4 in Table 2) work by increasing the salience
of data transfers and imbuing data with meaning. For example,
in intervention 4, we suggest that app platforms could flag apps
that ask for more data (of others) than technically needed, and
in intervention 2, we propose to make transfers more salient by
visualizing the process and possibly also the type of data. What
stands out is that these interventions primarily involve self-
regulation. Industry bodies, such as the Digital Marketing Insti-
tute or alliances of app software developers, could develop
best-practice guidance that includes such interventions. So too
could individual market players. For example, the Google Play
store as well as individual customer apps could change the way
data requests and transfers are visualized and worded (see inter-
vention 3 in Table 2).
E2: Encouraging Recognition
The need to recognize that we hold others’ data (R2) is unique to
interdependent privacy, and thus, little existing policy makes
explicit provision for it. As we have shown, it cannot be taken
for granted that sharers recognize whose data they have and
under what conditions they can use it. Recognition requires that
the data hold salient traces of the others. Interventions we sug-
gest to achieve this (see interventions 5–8 in Table 2) include
automated warnings such as “The data you are giving away may
belong to others. Do you have all necessary distribution rights?”
or increased personalization of data, such as “All your contacts
including the email of John.” In addition, salience of others
could be increased through enhanced decision control (Malhotra,
Kim, and Agarwal 2004), such as by asking sharers to give
consent for each different type of data. These suggestions could
be implemented as best-practice suggestions developed by
industry bodies or DPAs.
E3: Educating for Respect
Successful interdependent privacy management depends on
actors negotiating the boundaries of their respective rights
(Petronio 2015) and then adhering to these boundaries. To
prevent breaches of interdependent privacy, social contracts
are required to which consumers feel bound (for their general
role in privacy, see Martin [2016]). These can ensure respect
(R3) for what belongs to others. To do so, we suggest educat-
ing for respect (see interventions 9–14 in Table 2) and thus
combating the reigning norms of trivialization we identified
as causing disrespect. This could be achieved, for example,
through general information campaigns (see itervention 13),
but there is also the potential of policy intervention (see inter-
vention 10). The GDPR and Privacy Shield could be altered to
mandate automated permission links to be sent to others when
the system recognizes that others’ data is being shared to
require and ensure active consent by the third party. This
would close the consent loophole and affect the way people
think about sharing others’ data, but it would also place an
additional burden on consumers.
Given that we identified self-interest as a cause for failure to
respect what is others, we also suggest interventions that
increase individuals’ understanding of the potential for harm.
To achieve this, we suggest drawing on the power of stories
(Bruner 1990; Escalas 1998) that can demonstrate to consu-
mers that they are stewards of others’ data to whom blame can
be allocated. The DPA and privacy organizations could heavily
publicize real stories about data infringements, the infringed
person’s feelings and fate (intervention 12), and the conse-
quences for the infringer (intervention 11). For example, stories
from the Cambridge Analytica scandal are an opportunity to
deeply engage consumers with this issue.
Finally, we suggest that the 3R framework can help improve
harm-based approaches to policy. These are concerned with the
allocation of blame and compensation when privacy infringe-
ments have caused actual harm. Such approaches are also part
of the GDPR regulation that entails substantial fines for data
protection breaches (up to 4% of global turnover or €20 mil-
lion) and foresees a right for compensation under Article 82. In
intervention 14, we suggest that the courts could specify which
of the 3Rs were breached by sharers. If a sharer can genuinely
show no realization of transfer, then the recipient is solely to
blame. Our framework then would influence the type of infor-
mation requested and relied on in legal proceedings.
E4: Embracing Radical Alternatives
Both notice and choice and harm-based approaches to personal
data protection assume that sharers realize data transfer and
recognize and respect when these data belong to others. Our
first three classes of interventions can help make this a more
realistic assumption but do not relieve potential sharers from
the burden of going through all 3R stages whenever they or
their devices handle others’ data. Many consumers already
have surrendered to technology and “readily and willingly
exchange information under conditions and in circumstances
that they do not adequately understand” (Walker 2016, p. 145).
In response, we propose interventions that aim to mitigate the
risks of personal data infringements in the first place. We call
this class of interventions Embracing Radical Alternatives
because it substantially deviates from mainstream policies,
which still place an onus on the consumer. In contrast, these
interventions (interventions 15–17 in Table 2) put responsibil-
ities on intermediaries. They provide alternative protection
mechanisms, which are not policy based, though their
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operation would benefit from changes in policy. These
mechanisms are market-based and enable and stimulate novel
entrepreneurial opportunities. In addition, they heavily depend
on the establishment of a technological infrastructure that acts
on behalf of consumers, thus allowing technology to come to
the aid of a problem technology created (Walker 2016).
In policy terms, this class of interventions best aligns with
what can be called the “preventive approach.” Key principles,
which can also be found in the EU GDPR, are data minimiza-
tion, privacy by design, and privacy by default. All of these
preempt the possibility of consumers leaking personal data
(Williams, Nurse, and Creese 2016); yet they may not suffice.
After all, they need to be enacted by those who have an interest
in data collection. For example, despite three years’ notice, a
third of European companies remained underprepared for the
GDPR (Shepherd, Afifi-Sabet, and Hopping 2018), and Face-
book had planned to use the GDPR to reduce its liabilities (Gul
2018; Reuters 2018).
Additional steps are needed, which can also represent a
business opportunity. In intervention 15, we suggest working
on innovations that help prevent the collection of others’ data.
One recent example would be a cone of silence that prevents
smart speakers from listening in (Maloney 2019). Again, this
would only tackle part of the issue, and control over the risks
would lie with the sharer rather than the other. To move con-
trol to potential victims of interdependent infringement, we
suggest delegating the responsibility for protecting one’s own
and others’ data to technology (intervention 16) or
technology-assisted professionals (intervention 17). The first
refers to what can be called privacy-enhancing technologies
or privacy assistants (see www.privacyassistant.org). These
are technological agents that learn the privacy preferences
of their users over time, semiautomatically configure a range
of settings, and make many privacy decisions on behalf of
consumers who can thus maintain control of their own privacy
(see Jutla and Bodorik [2005]).
For instance, HAT (www.hubofallthings.com) can be used
to log in to apps and to provide only the data with which users
are comfortable. It is based on microserver technology that
allows individuals to store personal data as in a bank vault.
Furthermore, Wibson, a disruptive technology based on block-
chain, helps people connect to data sources such as Facebook
and monitor offers from data buyers to sell their personal data
(e.g., location data). Companies offering similar services
include digi.me, Ocean, and the U.S. start-up Datacoup. Pro-
vided there are unified data standards, these systems have the
potential to become capable of tracing the whereabouts of data
and instigating their sharing and deletion at the user’s request.
Ideally, they should also be programmable to allow dealing
with data concerning others. Technological development is
moving in that direction (Boden et al. 2017; Ross, McEvilley,
and Oren 2018).
A second proposition is the personal data manager, who,
assisted by software, can manage data for consumers, look after
consumers’ information on their behalf, and investigate when
and where this information is being used (Kamleitner and
Mitchell [2018] explain why this is necessary). Like personal
financial asset managers who manage a range of assets, per-
sonal data managers could carry out privacy risk assessments,
suggest actions to maximize personal data rewards, and be
liable for their recommendations. Although current regulation
allows for it, eventually this idea would require new legislation.
In the EU, this would involve the European Commission and
fall under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Justice,
Consumers and Gender Equality. An initiative could result
from lobbying activities by countries, industry bodies, or pri-
vacy advocacy organizations such as Privacy International,
noyb.eu, or the European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights. Alternatively, there could be a citizen’s initiative,
which could be instigated by only seven voting-age EU citizens
living in at least seven member states.2 In the United States, the
initiation of such a process might, for example, include the
Department of Justice, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Over-
sight Board, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the
Future of Privacy Forum, the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
or the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse.
Privacy assistants and personal data mangers place the onus
for realizing, recognizing, and respecting the transfer of the
data of others to software and professionals rather than consu-
mers. They are a response to Walker’s (2016) conclusion that
we currently surrender our data. With these interventions, we
advocate for more surrendering, but only to those who have the
knowledge and ability to protect the data. The implications of
widespread use of human and software data agents are consid-
erable. They would raise awareness among consumers of the
issues of personal and interdependent privacy, improve the rate
of identification of privacy breaches, and increase the number
of claims for compensation issued.
From a regulation of personal data markets perspective, data
managers would act as an extra monitoring mechanism. Given
the huge information asymmetries in personal data markets,
such a move has the potential to enhance fairness and consu-
mers’ market power. Because consumers already give their
data to companies, we assume that consumers would consider
these services a welcome relief from the burdens of privacy
protection. The success of personal data managers, however,
depends on the regulation of their statutory duties and their
monitoring. There are also questions of equal access to such
privacy protection across different social strata—how can reg-
ulators avoid a new form of discrimination where poor people
cannot afford privacy protection? Perhaps personal data man-
agers could be partly remunerated by the compensations
obtained from the successful prosecution of data breaches.
While there is money to be made from exploiting data, these
radical alternative interventions show that business models can
also be built on data protection. For marketers, this possibility
offers liability threats when firms take on the roles of sharers or
others and novel opportunities when they help develop the
interventions suggested here.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/basic-facts.
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Prioritizing Interventions
All interventions can help protect interdependent privacy, and
while some may appear obvious, they are not currently in place.
The task of getting every consumer to realize, recognize, and
respect others’ data is substantial and complicated. This is
partly because of the multiactor nature of the problem, which
involves numerous relevant parties such as companies, app
developers, direct marketing agencies, industry bodies, privacy
organizations, regulators, and consumers. As a result, respon-
sibility is spread among these actors, which means that there
may be limited motivation to ensure the privacy of others.
There is thus a need to consider how to prioritize these inter-
ventions. One way of doing so would be to take a stakeholder
perspective and decide on which stakeholders to involve first.
Because industry self-regulation is voluntary, adds cost, and
reduces data flows, one could prioritize privacy organizations
and regulators as the primary initial targets for change (for
some suggestions of which stakeholders are best-suited to take
care of which intervention, see Table 2).
Another useful and complementary perspective on prioriti-
zation considers the hierarchical nature of the 3R framework.
Sharers cannot possibly ensure respect for other’s rights with-
out first realizing that they are transferring something to which
others hold rights. This hierarchical contingency implies that
interventions designed to educate consumers about respecting
others’ data simultaneously ensure realization and encourage
recognition (see Table 2). From this perspective, interventions
that teach respect should be prioritized.
A final crucial consideration is that avoiding failure at the
3Rs places a cognitive and emotional burden on consumers and
takes their time. In an instant digital world where multiple
people engage with multiple data-collecting devices, multiple
others (e.g., on average Americans hold 634 phone contacts,
Hampton et al. 2011) would need to be asked before installing
any app that requests access to contacts. The potential for
request overload is clear. As Walker (2016, p. 145) argues,
“Requiring more data to be transparent will mean more infor-
mation for consumers to process, further challenging their abil-
ity to make sound decisions and engage in protection
behaviors.” In response, where possible, we advocate for
relieving consumers from the burden of protecting others and
prioritizing the suggested radical alternatives of privacy assis-
tants and data managers. That said, interested stakeholders
would be ill-advised to place their trust in a single intervention.
As a multiactor phenomenon that appears to result from several
forces (see Figure 2), successful interdependent privacy pro-
tection requires a range of interventions and an awareness of
the prevalence of failure at each stage.
General Discussion
Privacy has always been interdependent. However, an increas-
ing integration of technology in data transfers affects the ease
and scale with which interdependent privacy breaches happen
and the consequences that they entail. “Always on,” in-home,
artificially intelligent or at least “smart devices,” such as
Apple’s Siri; HomeKit; Microsoft’s Cortana; Amazon’s Alexa;
Google’s former home assistant, Allo; and smart TVs, are
installed in more and more homes. Such devices are permitted
to switch on at any time and can collect a wide range of data
about any human or device in the room. “As IoT-related sys-
tems capture more of the entirety of a consumer’s being in the
form of data, it will be as if more of a person will be inside the
Internet and is being passed around from machine to machine”
(Weinberg, Milne, and Hajjat 2015, p. 6) and from consumer to
consumer. The challenge of personal data protection is growing
and necessitates a better understanding of the dynamics that
induce the sharing of others’ information. Our 3R framework
provides such an understanding. It contributes to prior literature
by adding a multiactor perspective, juxtaposing interdependent
breaches of privacy and property, identifying hierarchical con-
tingencies, highlighting the primary forces that give rise to
them, and paving the way for different classes of interventions.
The privacy and consumer policy literature has hitherto
focused on the sharing of one’s own data. Our framework
extends this literature and explicitly recognizes the interdepen-
dent nature of privacy (Petronio 2015) and ownership (Rudmin
1991). In addition, our conceptual blend of privacy and prop-
erty paves the way for further transfers between these two
domains. For example, it suggests that insights on the sharing
economy might extend to the context of personal data sharing
and vice versa.
We also contribute by highlighting anteceding forces of the
3Rs (Realization, Recognition, and Respect of others’ data).
Salience of all elements in a transaction plays a key role for
Realization and Recognition. This explains why the problem is
of such relevance in the less visible and intangible digital
domain. Moreover, at the Respect stage, we find that social
norms might play a much stronger role in privacy protection
than prior literature suggests. And although our insights con-
firm a role for self-interest, which is central in many privacy
frameworks such as privacy calculus (e.g., Kehr et al. 2015),
they put its importance into perspective. Self-interest and eco-
nomic considerations only emerge as antecedent forces in the
final stage of the problem and appear no more important than
social norms. Thinking beyond the immediate antecedents, the
infringements, exemplified by Jane and Cambridge Analytica
in our opening examples, may be a symptom of digital native
cultures and socialization processes in an increasingly digital
society. The 3R framework can help shed light on such symp-
toms. It also helps show that interdependent and personal pri-
vacy protection are rooted in the same initial requirement for
realization of a transfer. Tackling interdependent privacy pro-
tection is thus also likely to increase self-protection.
To improve protection and reduce the prevalence of inter-
dependent infringements, we moreover contribute by offering a
set of novel interventions, the 4Es. We provide guidance on
who may be best suited to use them and on how to prioritize
them. The interventions listed in Table 2 amount to a versatile
toolbox that all interested stakeholders can draw on, further
adapt, and extend. In particular, we suggest a class of
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interventions that holds the potential to disrupt data markets
and privacy regulation, (partly) delegating data protection
responsibilities to digital assistants or personal data managers.
As intermediaries, personal data managers would interact with
marketers on consumers’ behalf. They would also become a
potential influential and knowledgeable stakeholder voice for
reform of future policy.
Finally, through our ongoing reference to the EU GDPR, we
contribute specific policy insights. Our insights can help explore,
challenge, and improve the adequacy of the recent EU GDPR
legislation. For example, under Article 14 (1a–f), GDPR con-
sumers do have the right to be informed “where personal data
have not been obtained from the data subject,” and under Article
17, they have the “right to be forgotten.” Both articles presume
that others, such as Jane’s contacts, are aware of, or can access,
all the details of all the organizations with which their data has
been shared. Our results suggest that this is unlikely. This seems
to be a major limitation in the current regulatory provision
designed to protect personal data and exemplifies our first R
(Realization) as a highly problematic issue for exercising even
the new and best-in-class rights under the GDPR. Furthermore,
in the EU, the DPA and eventually the courts need to add further
clarity to GDPR Article 2, which specifically excludes process-
ing of personal data for household or purely personal purposes.
Regulators need to decide if having others’ personal data on an
individual’s phone means that that individual has sharing rights
to the data. If so—and this is another point that needs clarifica-
tion—would this mean that the app provider does not need to
obtain consent from the original data owner?
Conclusion and Future Research
The framework highlights the limitations of current regula-
tion, which largely fails to reflect the interdependent and
dynamic nature of privacy. Specifically, current approaches
appear to underplay the key function of recognition and
respect in privacy protection and are ill-suited to reducing the
substantial burden of considering all 3Rs in the digital world.
The resulting 4E interventions and their applicability to indus-
try, regulators, and consumers could even disrupt data mar-
kets and privacy regulations as we currently know them. In
building the framework, we do not claim to know all that goes
on within it or all the ways it can be applied. Different and
varied applications of the framework will allow for greater
understanding of its potential uses, implications, and limita-
tions. A key point, however, is that the framework is designed
to focus on the sharer, because it is the sharer who has to
realize, recognize, and respect others’ data. This promotes
several avenues for further academic research.
One important avenue is to identify the extent to which data-
collecting systems such as apps, websites, or always-on devices
ensure realization, recognition, and respect. This would allow
researchers to determine the most problematic areas in practice
(e.g., messenger apps vs. retail). Another relevant future direc-
tion would be to test the effectiveness of the proposed inter-
ventions, for example, through experiments that change the
wording in permissions from “access” to “give away” or that
provide information on the exact amount of data being shared.
Future research should also explore the hierarchical relation-
ships between the 3Rs—that is, how much realization is needed
before recognition dawns? Alternatively, how much recogni-
tion is needed before respect follows? Our focus has been on
the sharer as a private individual. However, organizations also
may become infringers when they pass on their customer data
to other organizations or are the recipients of others’ data. To
revisit a previous question, if a device tracks and passes on
personal data, who then is responsible? The owner or user of
the device? The manufacturer of the device? Or any other
service provider that ensures that consumers obtain and use the
device? There is research to be done to establish how well the
3R framework translates to organizations and how well it is
suited to analyze the position of the recipient. Finally, there is
work to be done to pinpoint who around the world might be
(jointly) responsible for, or best suited to, changing data pro-
tection policy jurisdictions. Pressure groups, think tanks, and
groups other than legislators can all bring about an urgently
needed change that will prevent technological facilitation from
corrupting a human strength—our interdependent, social
nature—into an uncontrollable threat.
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